THE MARRIAGE CASES
AN INSIDER’S PERSPECTIVE
TEN YEARS LATER
At a few minutes before 10:00 a.m. on Thursday, May 15, 2008, attorneys who had worked for San Francisco litigating *In re Marriage Cases* were assembled in my City Hall office. We trolled the California Supreme Court’s website as we waited for the decision we’d been promised would be forthcoming, in a notice posted by the Court the day before. Some were optimistic, others apprehensive. I felt butterflies below my ribcage, nearer to my heart than my stomach. Dennis Herrera, my boss and the San Francisco city attorney, flitted in and out along with Matt Dorsey, our press guy, impatient for any news. Across the plaza at the courthouse was Matt’s assistant, Lexi Thomsen, whom we’d sent to get a hard copy of the opinion in case the Court’s website couldn’t handle the heavy traffic we knew it was receiving. After what felt like an eternity, we heard a sound in the distance that seemed like cheering. We wondered whether the anti-marriage equality forces waiting at the courthouse had the numbers to make such a sound carry all the way across the plaza. We were confident the pro-marriage forces did. Still, we wanted a firmer answer than that. We couldn’t immediately access the opinion online and the waiting became almost unbearable. Finally, the phone rang, and I answered it. “Lexi, is that you?”

Lexi was crying, and I had trouble understanding her. She was crying because she thought we had won, but she wasn’t sure. She had tried to glean the answer from the opinion but it wasn’t jumping out at her. “Take a deep breath,” I told her. “O.K., now start reading. From the beginning.” I put the phone on speaker. Lexi started to read. She kept reading. And reading. And reading. The answer wasn’t forthcoming. (Later I would have occasion to describe the opinion. “Pithy” was not one of the words I used.) While Lexi was reading the hard copy aloud to us on speakerphone, my colleague Amy Margolin succeeded in pulling up the opinion from the Court’s website. As she quickly scanned the opinion she began

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The Story of *In re Marriage Cases*:
Our Supreme Court’s Role in Establishing Marriage Equality in California

By Justice Therese M. Stewart*

* Therese M. Stewart is an associate justice on the California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Two, in San Francisco. Before joining the Court in 2014, she served for 12 years as the chief deputy city attorney for the City and County of San Francisco. In that capacity, she litigated a number of groundbreaking cases on behalf of the city, including *In re Marriage Cases*.
exclaiming. We won. On fundamental rights grounds, on privacy grounds and on equal protection grounds. Not just the rights that go along with marriage. The state could not offer us a lesser name. Our family relationships were entitled to the same dignity as opposite-sex couples' relationships received from the state. We had won the full right to marry. That moment we had been waiting for was a long time in coming.

BY “LONG TIME,” I DON’T MEAN THE FEW, albeit agonizing, minutes we sat there and waited for the opinion that day. And I don’t even mean just the four-year period between filing the case and the Supreme Court’s decision, when we presented evidence and argued the case in the Superior Court, Court of Appeal and California Supreme Court. I mean the many decades leading up to In re Marriage Cases, during which LGBT lawyers and organizations fought for incremental change to gain protection and acceptance for themselves and their intimate relationships. The issues had been far ranging, from child custody battles to gay bars’ liquor licenses, police harassment and entrapment to discrimination by landlords and employers, exclusion from federal and state employment and military service to intelligence agencies’ denial of security clearances, civil unions and domestic partnerships to equal benefits for employees in same-sex relationships, funding for HIV/AIDS to will contests and disputes over assets of those who died.

There had been many losses and setbacks for the movement, perhaps most significant the U.S. Supreme Court’s 1986 decision in Bowers v. Hardwick holding that states could criminalize same-sex intimacy without violating due process. In the wake of that decision, all 12 of the federal circuit courts rejected equal protection claims brought by LGBT people challenging discriminatory treatment. In the post-Bowers era, there was no safe harbor in the federal courts and no federal constitutional protection for gay people.

Perhaps in light of this, the right to marry, which many understood was a linchpin to full LGBT equality, had seemed virtually unattainable throughout the 20th century. In 2003, however, two auspicious events changed the legal landscape. In June of that year, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed its prior holding in Bowers, and held a Texas law making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in intimate sexual conduct impinged on individuals’ exercise of their liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause and violated the federal Constitution. That case was Lawrence v. Texas. Five months later, in a case called Goodridge v. Department of Public Health, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that limiting the protections, benefits and obligations of civil marriage to opposite-sex couples lacked a rational basis and violated the Massachusetts Constitution’s equal protection provisions.

SOMETIMES, WHAT IS ATTAINABLE IS IN THE EYE OF THE BEHOLDER. In California, at least, the first person to assert unequivocally that our state Constitution guaranteed same-sex couples the right to marry was an outsider, someone not part of the LGBT movement. Someone not chastened by the loss in Bowers and the grave harms it had visited on LGBT people in the ensuing decades. Someone who, though not a lawyer, understood basic constitutional principles of liberty and equality and believed those principles meant LGBT couples and families should be treated like all others. That someone was San Francisco’s then-mayor, Gavin Newsom.

On February 10, 2004, the city attorney and I met with the mayor and a few members of his staff in his office just around the corner from ours. He had attended Pres. George W. Bush’s State of the Union address at which the president had, in the wake of the Massachusetts court’s ruling, called for a federal constitutional amendment defining marriage as an opposite-sex union. Angered by this, the mayor told us what he was thinking of doing. He was leaning toward Thursday, February 12. He would marry a lesbian couple widely known and beloved in the LGBT community, Del Martin and Phyllis Lyon. Whether he would marry others as well was up in the air. I understood him to be telling us the train was about to leave the station and he hoped we would be on board. Litigation would follow immediately, and there was little time to prepare.

The next two days were a rush of activity. We pulled together a team of deputy city attorneys to research the many legal issues the mayor’s plan raised. Besides the basic argument in defense that the marriage laws’ exclusion of same-sex couples violated several constitutional provisions, the more immediate issue was whether the mayor and local county clerk, who was responsible for issuing marriage licenses in San Francisco, could take it upon themselves to deviate from the state marriage statutes on the ground that as written they were unconstitutional. Everyone’s gut reaction was they could not, but there was no case directly on point. The clerk, Nancy Alfaro, wanted to change the license application so that instead of referring to the “bride” and “groom,” it would be gender neutral. Regulations did not allow local changes to the state form, but that was the least of our worries. We prepared a legend to go with the train was about to leave the station and he hoped we would be on board. Litigation would follow immediately, and there was little time to prepare.

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On Thursday, February 12, the mayor married Phyllis and Del in an emotional ceremony attended by many leaders in the local LGBT community, including Roberta Achtenberg, Kate Kendall, Joyce Newstadt, and...
many others. Then the word went out. Same-sex couples who wished to marry would be allowed to obtain marriage licenses and have their marriages solemnized at San Francisco City Hall.

**THE RESPONSE WAS OVERWHELMING.** Couples flocked to City Hall applying for licenses and setting up appointments to have their marriages solemnized by deputy county clerks. A line snaked around the first floor of City Hall from the Clerk’s Office to the Rotunda. The phones in the Clerk’s Office began to ring nonstop. The clerk put out a call for volunteers to be trained and deputized to perform weddings. There was more demand than the city could handle. Members of the press were on hand to take photographs and memorialize the events.

I wasn't prepared for what awaited me when I stepped outside City Hall late that evening. Dozens of people with umbrellas and raincoats to ward off the drizzle lined the Polk Street side of City Hall. Many were sitting in folding chairs with blankets and sleeping bags. There were smiles and talking and laughter. Some were eating and drinking. The mood was festive. When I returned the next morning, they were still there, and the line had grown to encircle the entire city block around City Hall. I entered on the Grove Street side that morning, where the City Hall security staff allow those who work in the building to enter before it opens to the public. I went upstairs to my office on the second floor. I pulled up the shades on my balcony window and looked at all the people on the street below. Some waved. It was hard to hold back tears. The collective yearning of the gay community for equal treatment, for having the government recognize us as the families we are, was in full display that morning. I wondered whether Chief Justice Ronald M. George and the six associate justices, from their chambers across the plaza at the California Supreme Court building, could see the people who so wanted to marry that they had stayed outside in the rain all night in line around City Hall. I hoped they could and would see them.

On Friday, we received notice from Randy Thomasson, the head of an entity called Campaign for California Families (which we came to refer to as the “Campaign for Some California Families”), that he had filed a complaint and planned to seek injunctive relief on an ex parte basis the following Monday to stop the city from issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples. Thomasson was represented by an organization called Liberty Counsel that was affiliated with the late Reverend Jerry Falwell’s Liberty University. Later that day, we received notice of a second suit filed by a group called the Proposition 22 Legal Defense and Education Fund, which similarly had filed a writ against the mayor and county clerk and also planned to seek immediate writ relief on an ex parte basis the following week. (Proposition 22 was an initiative measure enacted by California voters in 2000 stating “Only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized in California.”) Prop. 22 was represented by an anti-gay organization called the Alliance Defending Freedom or ADF. Both groups sought immediate injunctive relief to stop the City and County of San Francisco from issuing marriage licenses to same-sex couples.

Shortly after getting word of these two cases, the mayor announced that City Hall would be open through the Valentine’s Day weekend for weddings. Every day of weddings counted. There was national and even international news coverage of the weddings at City Hall. Couples solemnly reciting marital vows before family members, including children. There was joy but also contemplation. Many who had come to engage in a political act found themselves grappling with a mix of emotions about what it meant to marry the person they most loved and to have that marriage recognized and honored by the government. Hearing and speaking the familiar words of the traditional wedding ceremony in reference to themselves and their loved ones evoked feelings far deeper than the political. There was a sense of finally being accepted and recognized, of belonging, of being a full citizen. It was a solemn moment for many, and the press photographs captured the quiet reflection and the sense of awe.

The depiction of gay and lesbian couples in this setting was a far cry from the usual media portrayals of gay people, drawn largely from the most colorful (and least clothed) participants in gay pride parades. That coverage had been used to demonize gay people, to portray a one-dimensional view that made us seem different from everyone else. Watching the weddings taking place on every balcony and niche and beneath the Rotunda of the grand Beaux-Arts building that is San Francisco’s City Hall, I suddenly realized that time was of the essence. The more weddings that took place, the stronger would be the sense on the community’s part that lesbian and gay relationships matter, just as much as heterosexual relationships do. And the longer the media coverage of this emerging sense could continue, the greater the impact the mayor’s acts of civil disobedience would have. Lesbian and gay couples, with and without children, would be seen as the family relationships so many of them are.

**WHEN THE TWO LAWSUITS WERE FILED,** we bought a small amount of time by contending Thomasson’s notice was untimely and had not provided the minimum time required for a hearing that Monday. In the meantime, the Prop. 22 case was set for an ex parte hearing on Tuesday, over which San Francisco Superior Court Judge James Warren would preside. Warren was the grandson of the late Chief Justice Earl Warren and was known as a highly intelligent and thoughtful judge.
It was fitting to have such an historic case begin before Warren.

Our strongest argument for staving off immediate relief that did not require Warren to make a constitutional ruling was that the petitioners could not show they would suffer any irreparable harm if the court did not grant immediate relief. I remember Robert Tyler, the ADF lawyer who appeared for Prop. 22, arguing that if men could marry other men and women could marry other women, then a person could marry their dog or a tree. Offensive as this argument seemed, drawing the not-so-veiled analogy between homosexuality and bestiality, I recall trying to make light of it, telling Judge Warren that, as a “dog person” I had deep affection for my dogs, but the idea that allowing same-sex couples to marry would produce a wave of requests for licenses to marry dogs and trees seemed far-fetched. In the end, our main argument — that petitioners had failed to show that allowing same-sex couples to continue to marry for a brief period would cause them or anyone else irreparable harm — carried the day. Instead of issuing a temporary restraining order, Judge Warren issued an order to show cause requiring San Francisco to return three weeks later to argue why he should not issue preliminary injunctive relief. A day or two later, Thomasson presented his ex parte motion to Judge Ronald Quidachay, who followed Judge Warren’s reasoning and set the show cause hearing in that case for the same date and time as the Prop. 22 case.

As the weddings continued into the middle of February, political pressure from various quarters, including the Governor’s Office, was brought to bear on the attorney general, who at the time was former legislator Bill Lockyer. Gov. Arnold Schwarzenegger issued press releases stating that there was chaos and anarchy at City Hall, and that if the attorney general did not step in and put a stop to the weddings violence might ensue. There was no such risk, but eventually, on February 27, 2004, the attorney general filed an original proceeding in the California Supreme Court requesting a writ of mandate and immediate injunctive relief to stop the weddings. The day before that filing, ADF, this time representing an individual California taxpayer named Lewis, had similarly filed a petition for writ of mandate in the state’s highest court. We wrote to the Court asking that it not take action before allowing us to file an opposition. The court ordered us to respond to both petitions by March 5.

On the afternoon of March 11, 2004, six days after we filed our opposition papers in both cases, the Supreme Court issued orders requiring us to “show cause ... why a writ of mandate should not issue, directing respondents to apply and abide by the [provisions of the Family Code barring same-sex couples from marrying] in the absence of a judicial determination that these statutory provisions are unconstitutional.” There was also a directive, and it was unequivocal. Pending the Court’s determination of the two original writ proceedings (known as Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco and Lewis v. Alfaro), city officials were to enforce and apply the Family Code provisions as written, without regard to their “personal view of the constitutionality of such provisions,” and “to refrain from issuing marriage licenses or certificates not authorized by such provisions.” The Court also made clear that in these proceedings it would decide only whether city
officials were “exceeding or acting outside the scope of their authority” and would not decide whether the Family Code provisions barring same-sex couples from marrying violated our state Constitution. Perhaps most significant, the Court said its order did “not preclude the filing of a separate action in superior court raising a substantive constitutional challenge to the current marriage statutes.”

On reading the order, one of my young colleagues, distraught that the Court had put a stop to the weddings, burst into tears. I had a different reaction. The weddings had begun on February 12, and it was now March 11. We had kept the weddings going, with the attendant favorable national and international media coverage about same-sex families and marriage equality, for a full month. When the weddings began, neither I nor the city attorney had been confident we could avoid a stay or injunction against city officials for even a week, and our efforts had supported the mayor in achieving forward momentum that already was longer lasting than we had dared to hope. Even better was the sentence in the Court’s order that we viewed as an invitation to continue our effort to overturn the marriage laws by starting anew in the Superior Court.

IT WASN’T NECESSARILY A BAD THING that the Court had declined to decide the constitutionality of the marriage statutes at this juncture. The tenor of the Court’s order suggested to me, at least, that it wasn’t particularly pleased with the mayor or the city. The George Court was known for being somewhat cautious and incremental in its approach to the evolution of the law. I thought it likely the Court viewed the mayor’s actions as a threat to the rule of law and an encroachment on its own authority to say what the state Constitution means, and these beliefs were borne out when we argued the Lockyer case in May of that year and in the Court’s opinion, issued in August. Another concern about having the Court address the constitutional merits immediately was that the Legislature had recently enacted our state’s first comprehensive domestic partner law, known as AB 205, and that law had not even taken effect yet. I feared the Court would view that law as providing an adequate substitute for marriage to California’s LGBT citizens. Having the merits of the constitutionality of the marriage statutes wait for another day, when the Court would not be so focused on the mayor and his civil disobedience and the domestic partner law would not be so recent, seemed to me a good thing. More time and lower court proceedings in which these issues could percolate was, on balance, a positive development.

Wasting no time, we took the Supreme Court up on its invitation that very afternoon by filing a new lawsuit on behalf of San Francisco challenging the marriage statutes under the California Constitution’s equal protection, liberty and privacy clauses. The next day, our friends at the National Center for Lesbian Rights (NCLR), Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund and the ACLU of Northern California filed a companion lawsuit on behalf of lesbian and gay couples who wished to marry. The Judicial Council consolidated those and other cases (including the Prop. 22 and Thomasson cases), which collectively came to be known as “In re Marriage Cases,” before Judge Richard Kramer in San Francisco Superior Court. It would be another four years before these cases, and the issue of whether the state Constitution guaranteed its LGBT citizens full equality in regard to their family relationships, reached the California Supreme Court.

There was a flurry of activity at the City Attorney’s Office in response to In re Marriage Cases. Many lawyers offered to work on any project we needed help on. And there were many. Lawyers at my former law firm worked on the case pro bono. We interviewed lesbians, gay men and their families about how denial of the right to marry had affected them, and prepared declarations for those who had compelling stories to tell. My favorites included Beilin Zia, a 70-year-old Chinese immigrant who told us about how important marriage is in Chinese culture, how all of her children save one had married, and that one, her daughter Helen, had a partner, Lia, whom she viewed as a daughter but did not know how to introduce to her friends. Another favorite was 16-year-old Michael Allen Quenneville, whose moms were lesbians. In his words, “Domestic partnership [is] not the same as marriage. It’s less than marriage and everyone knows it.”

I tasked interns in our office with preparing binders on each of the California Supreme Court justices that would include general information about them and their families, their rulings on matters directly affecting LGBT people, and their opinions on other issues within the umbrella of constitutional privacy, liberty and equal protection jurisprudence. They prepared a pressboard wall hanging for me with a photo of the trial court judge and each of the Supreme Court justices, including descriptions of them and how they had voted in recent LGBT cases. That pressboard would hang on my wall for the next four years as we contemplated how our arguments might be received by our ultimate audience.

IN AUGUST 2004, THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT issued its ruling in the Lockyer and Lewis cases. Its ruling that the mayor and other city officials lacked the power to decline to enforce the state marriage laws based on their own view that the law as written was unconstitutional was not unexpected. It had been clear from the argument in May of that year, if not earlier, that this was where the Court was headed. Though not a surprise, it was nonetheless a disappointment that the Court invalidated all of the approximately 4,000 marriages of
same-sex couples that had been solemnized by the city in 2004. The Court ordered the city to void the licenses and to refund all fees paid by the couples. There were dissents on that point by Justices Joyce L. Kennard and Kathryn M. Werdegar, which softened the blow. The language of Justice Kennard’s opinion was promising. But I wondered whether the majority understood the effect this part of its ruling would have on the couples, whom it had not allowed to intervene in the case to make the argument as to why the Court should leave those marriages intact. I tried to view that part of the ruling from the Court’s perspective. Even apart from the fact that it had been quite annoyed at the mayor and the city for taking the law into their own hands and, as Justice Marvin R. Baxter put it at oral argument, “creating this mess,” the Court was concerned about the uncertainty and potential litigation that could arise if employers, insurers, government agencies or others declined to recognize the marriages.

IN THE SPIRIT OF THE MAXIM THAT THE BEST DEFENSE IS A GOOD OFFENSE, we quickly put the loss in Lockyer behind us and focused on our constitutional challenge to the marriage laws. In my mind’s eye, I had envisioned a trial on the factual issues at the core of the case. The Prop. 22 and Thomasson opponents made all manner of assertions about gay people, our relationships, our parenting and the dire effects allowing us to marry would have on society. They truly believed that being lesbian or gay was a “choice,” that making that “choice” represented a form of mental illness, that our relationships were all about promiscuity and sex and bore no resemblance to family, and that we were out to convert straight people and especially children, into our deviant “lifestyle.” Beyond that, we posed a threat to their religious freedom because acceptance of homosexual relationships as a good thing was inconsistent with their religious beliefs. If the state condoned those relationships by recognizing them as marriages, it would be rejecting their firmly held religious beliefs that we were an abomination in the eyes of God. Through a trial on these issues, we could demonstrate the fallacy of these arguments, through a combination of lay witness testimony, expert testimony and skillful cross-examination of the purported experts and scholars our opponents would call. Many of these same individuals, who were far out of the mainstream of social science scholarship, had offered declarations and testimony in other cases. We knew what they were going to say, and we could meet their pseudo-science with experts of our own, whose scholarship would be far superior and difficult to challenge.

Our colleagues at NCLR, Lambda and the ACLU, who represented the gay and lesbian couples in the lead companion case, were not convinced a trial was the right course. This was a point of tension between us, but one that did not last long. Judge Kramer made it plain he had no interest in a trial. He wanted to decide the case on briefs, allowed all parties to submit whatever evidence they wished to present in declaration form, and set a schedule for argument.

Alongside NCLR and others, we argued the cases before Judge Kramer in December 2004. He asked questions of both sides but kept his cards close to the vest. His ruling came four months later in a thoughtful decision addressing only the sex discrimination claim. He held that by allowing men — but not women — to marry women, and allowing women — but not men — to marry men, the state was treating men and women differently based on their gender, and the marriage
statutes were therefore subject to strict scrutiny under our high Court’s equal protection precedents in the gender discrimination arena. There was no compelling justification for that differential treatment. The decision was celebrated in the LGBT community, but with full awareness that it represented only the first leg of a three-part journey through the trial and appellate courts that would be required to secure marriage equality for same-sex couples in California.

IT WOULD TAKE ANOTHER YEAR AND A HALF for us to complete the second leg of the journey, and we would end it in a place far from where we wanted to be.

We fully briefed the cases in the First District Court of Appeal by May 2006. The case was assigned to a panel of Presiding Justice William McGuiness, Justice J. Anthony Kline, and Justice Joanne Parrilli, and we presented oral argument in July 2006. It was an all-day affair, with three sets of opponents (the state, Prop. 22 and Thomasson) arguing against each of four sets of plaintiffs. Perhaps not surprising to those who know him as an engaged and active participant in oral argument, Justice Kline dominated the questioning. There were robust discussions of U.S. Supreme Court liberty and privacy cases, along with California Supreme Court cases on the same subject. By the end of the day, all of the advocates were exhausted. I was optimistic that Kline was on our side, but McGuiness and Parrilli were harder to read. The Recorder published a cartoon the following day depicting Justice Kline on the bench speaking with arms outstretched, one hand in front of McGuiness’s mouth and the other in front of Parrilli’s.

I was in the middle of a mediation across the Bay in Oakland, when the intermediate court’s ruling came down in October 2006. My office called and arranged for a copy to be delivered to me by messenger. During breaks in the mediation, I scoured the opinion. We had lost, with Justice McGuiness writing a lengthy majority opinion and Justice Parrilli concurring. The majority described the right at issue not as marriage, but as “same-sex” marriage and held that right was not protected by either due process or the constitutional right to privacy, laws treating gay men and lesbians differently from heterosexual persons did not trigger strict scrutiny analysis, and the state’s interest in “preserving the traditional definition of marriage” provided a rational basis for upholding the law. The majority seemed to say that because no California court had previously held strict scrutiny applied to laws treating lesbians and gay men less favorably than heterosexual persons and because Judge Kramer had declined to allow a trial on the issue, the Court of Appeal’s hands were tied. The majority concluded it was not the courts’ prerogative to “redefine” marriage. This was frustrating for many reasons, one of which was that Prop. 22 arguably prevented the Legislature from acting and, although the Legislature had nonetheless adopted a marriage bill, the governor had vetoed it, saying the courts should decide the issue. Needless to say, as an advocate and as a lesbian, I was deeply disappointed.

JUSTICE KLINE’S POWERFUL DISSENT WAS THE SILVER LINING. Its thrust was that the California Constitution’s express right to privacy guaranteed the same autonomy to make personal decisions about one’s life that had been recognized in U.S. Supreme Court and California Supreme Court cases. The decision whether and whom to marry, which the Supreme Court had recognized in Loving v. Virginia and our Supreme Court had recognized even earlier in Perez v. Sharp, was one that lesbians and gay men, like the mixed-race couples in those cases, had a constitutional right to make. Justice Kline recognized that in order to address whether same-sex couples had a fundamental liberty and privacy interest in marriage, one had to understand the attributes of marriage that had led to its recognition as a constitutionally protected right. In his opinion, “[t]he marital relationship is within the zone of autonomy protected by the right of privacy not just because of the profound nature of the attachment and commitment that marriage represents, the material benefits it provides, and the social ordering it furthers, but also because the decision to marry represents one of the most self-defining decisions an individual can make.” And, in his view, “there is nothing about same-sex couples that makes them less able to partake of the attributes of marriage that are constitutionally significant.”

In mid-November, the city, the NCLR plaintiffs and others filed their petitions for review. Even the State of California agreed review should be granted. The only party opposing review was Prop. 22. As expected, the Court granted review the following month. The third leg of our judicial journey was finally underway. I had not been entirely satisfied with our brief in the Court of Appeal and so decided to scrap it and start fresh. There were so many lenses through which we wanted the Court to see the issues. We started from a broad perspective, writing pieces on every topic we thought should be considered for inclusion in the brief: the California Supreme Court’s proud history of independently construing our state constitutional guarantees; the evolution of civil marriage laws in California and the role the Court had played in that evolution; the efforts to attain marriage equality through political branches of the state government and their failure to get the job done; the history of discrimination against lesbians and gay men; the state constitutional right to privacy and its guarantee of the right to marry; the gender stereotypes at play in the exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage; the irrationality of providing almost all of the
state law rights and obligations of marriage to same-sex couples while denying them the title and stature of marriage; and the parallels between the separate domestic partner regime for same-sex couples and laws providing separate but unequal facilities to racial minorities prior to Brown v. Board of Education.¹⁷

**OUR OPPONENTS, ESPECIALLY THE STATE, HAD AS THEIR RALLYING THEME “TRADEITION,”** reminiscent of the song from Fiddler on the Roof. They labelled marriage of opposite-sex couples “traditional marriage,” as if there was one enduring set of features that marriage had always represented. They labelled marriage of same-sex couples “same-sex marriage,” to suggest and emphasize that it was some entirely different idea that bore little, if any, resemblance to “traditional marriage.” We “the gays” were, in the view of Prop. 22 and Thomas, out to destroy marriage as it had “always” been understood. And even if that wasn’t our intent, it would be the effect. As lesbians and gay men flocked to marriage, opposite-sex couples would cease to value it. They would run the other way. At best, they argued, the effect on the institution they called “traditional marriage” of allowing same-sex couples to marry was unknown and unknowable, and the state had the right to preserve the status quo until some unidentified future point when it would all become clearer. (How it would become clearer while the status quo was being maintained was not explained.)

We had a counter-narrative, of course, and it was rooted in what we viewed as a more accurate understanding of history. Marriage had evolved constantly since our country became a nation and California became a state. That evolution reflected, most significantly, a trend away from a model in which men had virtually all of the power in the relationship toward one that recognized women as equal partners. Thus, coverture had been rejected at California’s founding in favor of a community property model, both spouses now had the right to manage and use community property, both had equal rights and obligations to support and care for children, and divorce did not require either party to prove the other was at fault. Women now assumed the same obligations as men upon marrying, including those of supporting their spouses and children. Our opponents’ view of marriage as necessitating two individuals of the opposite gender was based on anachronistic notions of gender roles that had long since been removed from the law governing marriage.

This line of argument forced our opponents into reliance on the one difference between opposite-sex and same-sex couples that was undeniable: the former can readily reproduce and have children who are the genetic offspring of both, whereas the latter require some form of intervention to bring children into the world. Our opponents’ reliance on this difference was ripe with problems and contradictions. First, they had to argue, in essence, that children who are genetically related to both parents are the primary goal of marriage, which had never been the case. Opposite-sex couples adopt children, raise step-children, and use assisted reproduction just as same-sex couples do, and none had been ejected from marriage for failing to have the “right kind” of offspring, or for having none at all. Our opponents also argued opposite-sex couples can “accidentally procreate,” and that marriage exists to “channel” their procreation into stable family units. Because same-sex couples do not have children by “accident,” the argument goes, they have no need for such “channeling.” As NYU Law Prof. Kenji Yoshino wrote in an op-ed around this time, first anti-gay advocates argued gay people were not good enough for marriage and now they were arguing we were too good for it.

The state, represented by the attorney general,¹⁸ along with the Prop. 22 and Thomas partners, was defending California’s marriage statutes. However, it sought to distance itself from the two organizations and some of their anti-gay rhetoric. In its briefs, the attorney general strenuously avoided arguments that lesbians and gay men would destroy marriage, that they or their families were unequal to others and that the law expressed a preference for families with “biological children” over any other kind of family. But avoiding these arguments left the state on a tightrope between our side and that of the anti-gay organizations. The state had basically three arguments, two of which presupposed the constitutional standard that would govern would be the lenient rational basis test rather than any higher level of scrutiny. Its first argument was that there was a state interest in preserving the tradition of opposite-sex marriage. The problem with this was that if “preserving tradition” provided a basis for preserving the status quo, it would be hard to find any law that would not survive constitutional scrutiny. A justification, even a questionable one, must be more than “we’re used to things this way.” The state’s second argument was that it had an interest in leaving the issue to the political branches to resolve. This argument suffered from the same flaw as the first one; it would render constitutional review, at least in rational basis cases, meaningless. The state was asking the Court to say it was not its job to decide the constitutionality of the law. The state’s third argument was in essence that domestic partnership was equal to marriage, that the two now had most or all of the same legal rights and benefits, and the difference in name and stature was constitutionally insignificant. The last argument was the one, it seemed to me, that had the best possibility of gaining traction.

After crafting many parts of a potential brief addressing these issues, we set about editing them, but even with...
major cutting we were unable at first pass to reduce the draft below 200 pages. More had to be done. I enlisted a brilliant colleague, Paul Zarefsky, who had not been involved in the case to that point, to read the brief and suggest how it might be revised and pared down to a manageable size. Paul did much to improve and shorten the draft, but it was still too long. I could not bear even to look at it anymore and asked one of the chief drafters, Vince Chhabria, to take on the task of making the hardest decisions to reduce the brief to a size we could reasonably expect the Court would allow us to file. In the end, our brief focused most heavily on the equal protection-sexual orientation argument, and paid very little attention to the autonomy-privacy argument that was so central to Justice Kline’s dissent in the Court of Appeal. However, we were confident that our colleagues at NCLR, Lambda and the ACLU would cover all the bases in their brief, and Justice Kline had done us the favor of making the privacy argument as well as it could possibly be made. There would also be more opportunities for briefing, both in reply to the state’s and the Prop. 22/Thomasson respondents’ briefs, in response to the 44 amicus briefs filed on both sides of the case and, as it turned out, in supplemental briefing the Court directed the parties to file addressing a series of questions raised by the Court.

BY THE END OF 2007, WITH ALL BRIEFS FILED, IT WAS TIME TO PREPARE FOR ORAL ARGUMENT: We held two in-house moot court sessions, one with myself and Shannon Minter, who would argue for the NCLR plaintiffs, and a set of moot judges drawn from our office and his, and another moot in which I argued to a panel of lawyers we selected from the community, including my former partner Jerry Falk and Stanford Law Prof. Pam Karlan. Finally, my last moot would be in front of an audience at Golden Gate Law School, where Prof. Myron Moscowitz organized moot sessions for cases to be argued in appellate courts around the state. The worst thing about mooting is that you trip and fall in front of your colleagues, and in the case of the Golden Gate session, in front of an auditorium full of law students. The best thing is that questions come at you in ways you do not expect, providing you the opportunity to prepare for them before the real argument takes place. I recall that Myron asked a question that really stumped me. It went something like this: “What authority do you have supporting the proposition that the name ‘marriage’ has constitutional significance?” That question would stay with me for the next few weeks as I prepared for argument.

Eventually I realized that I had the answer to that question all along. I just had not anticipated the question coming at me in that form. Myron’s point was the one I’d been worried about from the outset of the case. Why isn’t the domestic partner law good enough? So what if it has a separate name; why does that matter if it provides all of the rights and obligations that marriage provides to opposite-sex couples? Of course, I knew the answer to the question phrased that way. The name “domestic partnership” is new. It does not carry the prestige and universal understanding that comes with “marriage.” The different title brings a different stature, a lesser stature in the case of domestic partnership. It is a parallel institution, yet one that is by dint of its separateness, necessarily unequal. But what authority could I cite for that proposition, I wondered. As I read back over all of the research we had done and the cases we had cited, it came to me. Segregation cases, and in particular, two pertaining to higher education, held the answer. I crafted a response to Myron’s question using Sweatt v. Painter19 and United States v. Virginia.20

As I practiced for oral argument, I tried out different parts of the argument on my partner, Carole Scagnetti. She persuaded me that I should not save this point for response to a question but rather should lead with it. And that is what I did.

ON MARCH 4, 2008, WE ARRIVED EARLY at the courthouse at 350 McAllister Street. On the fourth floor, the line of people eager to attend the argument stretched from the metal detector all the way to the end of the hallway. With my argument binder, the city attorney, and my colleagues Vince Chhabria and Danny Chou by my side, we bypassed the line, informed the security staff we were counsel, and were permitted into the courtroom. As other counsel arrived and those in attendance filed in, the room became noisy and I closed my eyes and focused on breathing to keep myself calm and keep my nervous energy in check. Eventually, the court clerk, Frederick Ohlrich, gave the argument day speech I had heard him give twice before, instructing counsel on Supreme Court etiquette and reminding us not to use justices’ names if we were at all uncertain of them. I knew I would be the first to argue and I used the button that controls the podium to lower it to the height at which I could see my notes if needed and be sufficiently close to the microphone to be heard.

The gavel sounded three times. “The honorable chief justice and associate justices of the Supreme Court of California. Hear ye, hear ye, hear ye. The Honorable Supreme Court sitting en banc is now in session. Please be seated.” The case was called, we stated our appearances and the argument began. After a brief preface about what I intended to address, I began.

“Words matter. Names matter. We know that from cases like Sweatt v. Painter and United States v. Virginia. In those cases, the Supreme Court held that the injustice of excluding blacks and women from institutions of higher learning that were highly regarded and rich in traditions and prestige could not be remedied
by creating new and separate schools that lacked all of those qualities.”

Chief Justice George interrupted with the first question and I forgot about the camera, the audience, my opponents and my colleagues. It was a conversation between the justices and me, and in that moment, nothing else mattered. The justices were, of course, well prepared, and their questions went right to the heart of the matter. I answered them as directly as I could, and my 30-minute argument flew by.

The chief was engaged and asked the lion’s share of the questions, or so it seemed to me that day. That said, all six of the associate justices asked challenging questions. At some point in the argument I became confident we had the chief on our side. He spoke eloquently in asking a question about the institution of marriage and how it had evolved over the decades since our Constitution was first adopted. I don’t remember all of what went into my strong conviction that we had his vote, but I do remember feeling certain that we did by the time I sat down. Justice Ming Chin asked a number of questions about domestic partnership and why I contended it wasn’t equal to marriage, and Justices Baxter and Carol A. Corrigan also asked difficult questions focused on why this issue wasn’t one for the Legislature rather than the Court. Justice Kennard paraphrased our arguments and asked me to confirm this was what we were arguing. I had hoped to get her vote ever since she dissented from the nullification of the licenses in the *Lockyer* case. Justices Werdegar and Carlos R. Moreno held their cards close to the vest. Nonetheless, when I sat down I was certain we had won the case. It had always seemed to me that our success or failure would depend on the chief justice. He was cautious, but a strong leader. If he was with us, I felt certain at least three justices would join him. I hoped we might get more, but it didn’t matter. To win, we needed four, and that was good enough.

I whispered in my colleague Vince’s ear when I sat down. “We are going to win.” He looked back at me with a little skepticism, not sure why I was so sure. Perhaps it was as much what I felt in my interactions with the justices that day as it was the questions they’d asked. Whatever it was, I felt certain.

Shannon Minter did an outstanding job arguing for our side, responding to a series of challenging questions, such as whether the authors of the state Constitution contemplated same-sex couples marrying, whether by adopting the domestic partner law the Legislature had conceded that same-sex couples were entitled to equal treatment, and whether if that were the case, the Legislature should be concerned that by enacting progressive laws it would enshrine them into our Constitution. Justice Baxter asked how the voters could have acted irrationally in adopting Prop. 22 given that at the time they adopted it no state or country permitted same-sex couples to marry. Shannon deftly responded by observing...
that the same could be said of the interracial marriage law at the time it was adopted; even by the time the California Supreme Court struck that law down, few, if any, states permitted interracial marriage.

The Prop. 22 and Thomasson lawyers faced an equally challenging series of questions, and seemed not to appreciate their audience. They had backed themselves into a corner by arguing that the ideal family is one with “biological” children, apparently unaware that Justice Moreno had an adopted child and that none of the justices were receptive to the argument that the marriage laws are solely focused on procreation.

Perhaps predictably, Deputy Attorney General Chris Krueger, who argued for the state, made a yeoman’s effort but struggled mightily to stay on the tightrope the state’s arguments had placed him on. He made a valiant effort to defend the law in the only way he could without demeaning lesbians, gay men and their families. I felt sorry for him. But not nearly sorry enough to want him to prevail.

WE RETURN NOW TO MAY 15, 2008. By about 10:10 a.m. after what had seemed like an eternity, we finally had the California Supreme Court’s opinion and were reading it. By the end of the introduction, at page 12 of the slip opinion, we understood finally that we had indeed won the case. The Chief Justice wrote:

One of the core elements of the right to establish an officially recognized family that is embodied in the California constitutional right to marry is a couple’s right to have their family relationship accorded dignity and respect equal to that accorded other officially recognized families, and assigning a different designation for the family relationship of same-sex couples while reserving the historic designation of “marriage” exclusively for opposite-sex couples poses at least a serious risk of denying the family relationship of same-sex couples such equal dignity and respect. We therefore conclude that although the provisions of the current domestic partnership legislation afford same-sex couples most of the substantive elements embodied in the constitutional right to marry, the current California statutes nonetheless must be viewed as potentially impinging upon a same-sex couple’s constitutional right to marry under the California Constitution.

Furthermore, the circumstance that the current California statutes assign a different name for the official family relationship of same-sex couples as contrasted with the name for the official family relationship of opposite-sex couples raises constitutional concerns not only under the state constitutional right to marry, but also under the state constitutional equal protection clause. . . .

As we shall explain, . . . we conclude that strict scrutiny . . . is applicable here because (1) the statutes in question properly must be understood as classifying or discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation, a characteristic that we conclude represents — like gender, race, and religion — a constitutionally suspect basis upon which to impose differential treatment, and (2) the differential treatment at issue impinges upon a same-sex couple’s fundamental interest in having their family relationship accorded the same respect and dignity enjoyed by an opposite-sex couple.21

As I attempted to quickly get my brain around the decision and its implications, Amy Margolin kept piping up enthusiastically to read snippets aloud. I sent her and everyone else out of my office. I can’t read or think with interruptions or background noise, and we had a conference call with NCLR and the press scheduled for later that morning.
I skimmed over the Court’s discussion of the procedural history of the cases, whether Prop. 22 and Thomasson had standing (it held they did not), and the domestic partner law to get to the meat of the decision. The Court held that the right to marry is a fundamental right protected by the state Constitution, that the right we were seeking was the same constitutionally protected right to marry that opposite-sex couples enjoy and not some other or different right called "same-sex marriage."

The opinion rejected our opponents’ argument that excluding same-sex couples from marriage was necessary to protect marriage and opposite-sex couples. We would not deprive them of any rights and, by choosing to marry, would subject ourselves to all of the same obligations currently imposed on opposite-sex couples. It recognized the very real harm the separate regime imposed on gay people.

[R]etaining the traditional definition of marriage and affording same-sex couples only a separate and differently named family relationship will, as a realistic matter, impose appreciable harm on same-sex couples and their children, because denying such couples access to the familiar and highly favored designation of marriage is likely to cast doubt on whether the official family relationship of same-sex couples enjoys dignity equal to that of opposite-sex couples. . . . Finally, retaining the designation of marriage exclusively for opposite-sex couples and providing only a separate and distinct designation for same-sex couples may well have the effect of perpetuating a more general premise — now emphatically rejected by this state — that gay individuals and same-sex couples are in some respects "second-class citizens" who may, under the law, be treated differently from, and less favorably than, heterosexual individuals or opposite-sex couples.

Its description of the scope of the right to marry was especially moving.

[O]ur decisions . . . recognize that the legal right and opportunity to enter into such an officially recognized relationship also is of overriding importance to the individual and to the affected couple. . . . The ability of an individual to join in a committed, long-term, officially recognized family relationship with the person of his or her choice is often of crucial significance to the individual’s happiness and well-being. The legal commitment to long-term mutual emotional and economic support that is an integral part of an officially recognized marriage relationship provides an individual with the ability to invest in and rely upon a loving relationship with another adult in a way that may be crucial to the individual’s development as a person and achievement of his or her full potential.

Further, entry into a formal, officially recognized family relationship provides an individual with the opportunity to become a part of one’s partner’s family, providing a wider and often critical network of economic and emotional security. . . . The opportunity of a couple to establish an officially recognized family of their own . . . also permits the couple to join the broader family social structure that is a significant feature of community life. Moreover, the opportunity to publicly and officially express one’s love for and long-term commitment to another person by establishing a family together with that person also is an important element of self-expression that can give special meaning to one’s life. Finally, of course, the ability to have children and raise them with a loved one who can share the joys and challenges of that endeavor is without doubt a most valuable component of one’s liberty and personal autonomy. Although persons can have children and raise them outside of marriage, the institution of civil marriage affords official governmental sanction and sanctuary to the family unit, granting a parent the ability to afford his or her children the substantial benefits that flow from a stable two-parent family environment, a ready and public means of establishing to others the legal basis of one’s parental relationship to one’s children . . . and the additional security that comes from the knowledge that his or her parental relationship with a child will be afforded protection by the government against the adverse actions or claims of others.

By the time of the conference call, when I had read as much of the opinion as I could, it was difficult to stanch the flow of emotions within me that resulted from the realization of just how well the Court understood not only our arguments, yet our experiences as people who had been treated as outsiders for most of our lives. But, as had been the case from the beginning of this odyssey, there was no time for feelings. We had a press conference to cover and celebrations to attend.

The following days and weeks were filled with reading and responding to new pleadings and briefs submitted by our opponents and their supporters, in a last-ditch effort to get the Court to stay its decision, and advising city officials about the meaning of the decision and when the decision would become final and about their plan to re-open City Hall to weddings of same-sex couples.
At some point, I received a call from Howard Mintz, a reporter from the San Jose Mercury News, who had heard that I planned to marry my partner of 16 years. He asked me how it felt to be getting married after working on the Marriage Cases for the last four years. I did not expect it to happen, but his question pulled out the cork that had kept the bottle emotions that had been fermenting for as long as I had been working on the case, and probably longer. In that brief moment, the emotions flowed, uncontrolled. I tried to say something cogent to Howard but couldn’t hold back tears. I think he was stunned, and I certainly was. After the call, I tried to put the cork back in, which was prudent because, as it turned out, we were far from done.

THANKS TO CHIEF JUSTICE GEORGE AND THE CALIFORNIA SUPREME COURT, Carole and I were legally married at City Hall in August 2008. One could view the victory in In re Marriage Cases as short lived since about five months after the Court issued it the voters enacted Proposition 8, which amended our state Constitution to explicitly deny marriage to same-sex couples. But I don’t view it that way at all. Key tenets of the Court’s decision survived Proposition 8, including that in all contexts but marriage in California strict scrutiny applies to classifications that distinguish LGBT people from others. More than that, the decision served as a foundation upon which subsequent legal victories were won, including state supreme court decisions in Connecticut, Iowa, and other states, the federal court decisions that restored marriage equality in California, and the United States Supreme Court’s 2015 decision in Obergefell v. Hodges holding that same-sex couples have the same federal constitutional right to marry that opposite-sex couples enjoy. In re Marriage Cases was a landmark decision that, in the end, was not diminished by Proposition 8. It was Proposition 8, and not In re Marriage Cases, that ended up being a blip on the radar screen of the movement for LGBT equality. That movement continues, and I have no doubt that In re Marriage Cases, like Perez v. Sharp before it, will continue to provide meaning to the courts in their role of interpreting and enforcing our state constitutional guarantees.

ENDNOTES

1. The California Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in the case may be found at 43 Cal.4th 757.
6. Lewis v. Alfaro was addressed in the same opinion as Lockyer v. City and County of San Francisco, 33 Cal.4th 1055.
7. Lockyer, supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 1132 [Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting] “For many, marriage is the most significant and most highly treasured experience in a lifetime. Individuals in loving same-sex relationships have waited years, sometimes several decades, for a chance to wed, yearning to obtain the public validation that only marriage can give.”
8. Id. at p. 1117 “[W]e believe it would not be prudent or wise to leave the validity of these marriages in limbo for what might be a substantial period of time given the potential confusion (for third parties, such as employers, insurers, or other governmental entities, as well as for the affected couples) that such an uncertain status inevitably would entail.”
10. See, e.g., id. at p. 712 “[California courts have not decided whether sexual orientation is a suspect classification under our state Constitution’s equal protection clause]; id. at p. 713 [“The trial court did not conduct an evidentiary hearing, and no factual record was developed addressing the three suspect classification factors”]; id. at p. 714 [“Lacking guidance from our Supreme Court or decisions from our sister Courts of Appeal, and lacking even a finding from the trial court on the issue, we decline to forge new ground in this case by declaring sexual orientation to be a suspect classification for purposes of equal protection analysis.”].
11. See id. at pp. 685, 693, 696–697, 700–701, 705.
12. See id. 49 Cal.Rptr.3d at pp. 731–764 [Kline, J., dissenting].
15. Id. at p. 736.
16. Id. at p. 740.
18. Bill Lockyer was the attorney general when the cases were initiated. By the time the California Supreme Court heard the cases in 2008, Jerry Brown held that office.
22. Id. at pp. 784–785.
23. Id. at pp. 816–817, footnotes omitted.
The law loves building metaphors. The highest compliment one can give a lawyer is that she or he has "framed" or "structured" a "carefully constructed" argument upon a "solid foundation" and a "concrete" analysis.

But we must remember that even buildings are not set in stone. They can be remodeled beyond recognition, or torn down and rebuilt in entirely different form. Los Angeles is a place that is "fundamentally ad hoc in spirit," and the stories its buildings tell are not only inconsistent, but conflicting.

In the words of Christopher Hawthorne, chief design officer for the city of L.A., the city simply cannot be explained in its entirety in one overarching analysis. It requires, as he puts it, a “certain humility” and a recognition that it can wriggle “out of your grasp” just as you try to pin the city down.

This is the second part of an ongoing series where we act as urban archaeologists to unearth legal stories that emerge from buildings within a 10-square block radius of downtown Los Angeles.

Let’s continue the dig.

**Clarification**
The Fall/Winter 2017 Newsletter described oil tycoon Edward Doheny as having his offices in the Security Building at 510 South Spring Street. Doheny worked out of the Security Building during critical moments, e.g., his son Ned’s delivery of $100,000 in cash to Interior Secretary Edward Fall, and when federal judges nullified his Elk Hills leases for corruption and fraud.

However, in 1926, Doheny moved into his own building, the ornate Petroleum Securities Building, at 714 West Olympic Blvd. He was headquartered there during many of the other key events in his life: the double killings of Ned Doheny and his aide Hugh Plunkett, and Doheny’s criminal trial and acquittal for bribery.

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* Bob Wolfe, the tour author, has been a practicing appellate attorney in Los Angeles since the 1970s. A lifelong L.A. resident, he authored “Where the Law Was Made in L.A.,” Los Angeles Lawyer (March 2003). Bob is a board member of the California Supreme Court Historical Society and Public Counsel. He can be reached at Bob.Wolf@outlook.com.
The Bradbury Building — which has been called L.A.’s “biggest architectural movie star” — is perhaps best known as one of the highly visible interiors in director Ridley Scott’s 1982 dystopian film “Blade Runner.”

But it is another utopian vision that inspired this beloved 125-year-old building. In his best-selling futurist novel, *Looking Backward: From 2000 to 1887*, author Edward Bellamy (pictured below) wrote about a fictional character (Julian West) who was placed in a hypnotic trance in 1887 and did not awaken until the year 2000.

Bellamy describes the spectacular interior of the public building in which his protagonist found himself: “a vast hall full of light, received not alone from the windows on all sides, but from the dome.... The walls and ceiling were frescoed in mellow tints, calculated to soften without absorbing the light which flooded the interior.”

Bellamy’s depiction is said to have motivated the Bradbury Building’s design.

Bellamy’s next-century world is not only light-filled, but law-free. Bellamy, himself a lawyer (albeit a non-practicing one) wrote about a lawless world: “We have no such things as law schools. The law as a special science is obsolete. . . . Everything touching the relations of men to one another is now simpler, beyond any comparison, than in your day. We should have no sort of use for the hair-splitting experts who presided and argued in your courts.”

Somewhat ironically, a lawyer, John Bicknell, was instrumental in the Bradbury Building’s construction. Bicknell, who had formed a close friendship with a retired gold miner, Louis Bradbury, oversaw construction of the building when Bradbury suddenly died in 1892, securing a loan against the Bradbury estate when the building’s costs neared an astronomical $500,000. Bicknell ordered the building’s 400 tons of cast-iron decoration and the water-powered bird-cage elevators.

Bicknell was an early tenant of the building; after James Gibson joined as a partner in 1897, the firm was known as Bicknell, Gibson & Trask. In 1903, the law firm of Dunn & Crutcher moved into three adjoining rooms in the Bradbury Building. The two firms “amalgamated” in January 1904 to become what is now known as Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher, moving to larger quarters in the new Pacific Electric Building six months later.

It took another lawyer, 85 years later, to again rescue the Bradbury Building, then empty except for the ground floor, and restore it to its former glory. In April 1989, Ira Yellin (pictured above), along with other investors, bought the building for $8 million and undertook a restoration project with noted preservation architect Brenda Levin. Yellin, who died in 2002 at age 62, was one of the co-founders of Public Counsel, the largest pro bono legal nonprofit in the U.S.
A Murderous Campaign for Judge

The 500-room Alexandria Hotel was L.A.’s first luxury hotel, constructed at a cost of $2 million, with 362 rooms, each with a bath. Over the years, it played host to Presidents Theodore Roosevelt, William Howard Taft, and Woodrow Wilson, as well as other notable personages, including King Edward VIII, Winston Churchill, Sarah Bernhardt, Douglas Fairbanks and Mary Pickford.

In 1931, David Clark used the Alexandria Hotel as his campaign headquarters as he portrayed himself as a “crime-busting attorney” in his judicial race against sitting Judge Charles MacCoy. The 33-year old “Debonair Dave” Clark had been a star prosecutor in the D.A.’s office, securing the conviction for the attempted murder of gangster Albert Marco, and prosecuting an extortion case against starlet Clara Bow’s personal secretary Daisy DeVoe. Clark won the L.A. Times’ endorsement for his “courage and sound judgment.”

But in May 1931, Clark was arrested and charged with double homicide in the slaying of crime boss Charles Crawford, the so-called “Gray Wolf,” and journalist Herbert Spencer.

Clark was still in a jail cell in the Hall of Justice on election day, June 2, 1931. He barely lost, receiving 67,000 votes to MacCoy’s 71,000. He was granted bail the next day.

Clark was twice tried for murder, with the first trial resulting in a hung jury. In October 1931, the jury in the second trial returned with a “not guilty” verdict, accepting Clark’s defense that Crawford pulled a gun on him and called on Spencer for help.

Clark thereafter began working as a lawyer for former LAPD police captain Guy McAffee, Crawford’s rival mob kingpin, known as the “Capone of L.A.” Clark also representing gambling and other similar interests.

In July 1953, Clark, by then unemployed, moved into his best friend, George Blair’s house. (Blair reputedly had helped finance Clark’s murder defense in 1931.) In November 1953, Clark shot and killed George’s wife Rose after she upbraided him for mooching off the Blair family. Clark died in prison in February 1954.

Raymond Chandler’s short story “Spanish Blood,” is based upon Clark’s shooting of Crawford and Spencer.

1. See, e.g., Ex Parte Williams (1932) 127 Cal.App. 424 [unsuccessful habeas corpus petition by David Clark on behalf of dog race owners who were jailed for contempt for refusing to testify in D.A.’s attempts to shut down Culver City greyhound race track].
Race Restrictions: Buying into the American Dream

In 1913, the Title Guarantee Co. moved into this 9-story Renaissance-style building on the southeast corner of Fifth and Broadway. The upper floors housed upscale retailers, which faced a wide corridor designed to resemble a street.

The company, which was less than 20 years old, was organized to validate land ownership in Southern California by issuing certificates of title. Its archives grew to contain records of every real estate transaction in Los Angeles County since 1850, as well as records of the previous Mexican Ayuntamiento, or town council.

In 1916, the Title Guarantee Co. sued H.L. Garrott, an African-American police officer, to force him to forfeit his purchase of a home at 420 West 59th Place in south Los Angeles and to reconvey it without compensation. It relied on a deed restriction prohibiting a sale "to any person of African, Chinese or Japanese descent." (Garrott had used a white man to initially buy the house.)

Garrott was represented by attorney Wil- lis O. Tyler (pictured), a Harvard Law School graduate, who practiced in L.A. for more than 35 years.

Superior Court Judge John W. Shenk sustained Garrott’s demurrer to the Title Guarantee litigation. Judge Shenk ruled that Garrott, as a citizen of both California and the U.S., "is entitled ‘to acquire property’ under the state [C]onstitution and to ‘the equal protection of the laws’ under the federal [C]onstitution."

Following Judge Shenk’s ruling, a group of adjoining property owners raised funds to further pursue amicus curiae in this and other cases. As quoted in the L.A. Times, the group insisted that segregated neighborhoods would "avoid disorder and violence [and] make a better feeling among the races. . . ."

For some reason, it took three years for Garrott’s case to be resolved on appeal. In July 1919, the Court of Appeal affirmed Judge Shenk’s ruling, but on different grounds. The court rejected the constitutional claims, holding they did not apply to private contracts. But the Garrott court held that restrictive covenants violated the public policy against restrictions on the alienation of property: "[T]he tying up of real property has been regarded as an evil that is incompatible with the free and liberal circulation of property as one of the inherent rights of a free people."

In September 1919, the California Supreme Court denied a petition for hearing in Garrott. But as we shall see, another California Supreme Court decision made this a momentary triumph and a hollow victory.

In 1924, Judge Shenk was appointed to the California Supreme Court, where he served for 35 years until his death in 1959. In sharp contrast to his ruling in the Garrott case, Shenk dissented from the Court’s landmark decision striking down California’s anti-miscegenation laws because “there is . . . a great deal of evidence to support the legislative determination . . . that intermarriage between Negroes and white persons is incompatible with the general welfare. . . .”

Race Restrictions: Living the American Dream — NOT!

From its headquarters in a 13-story steel frame building, the L.A. Investment Co. intended to build and sell more than 12,000 modern bungalows over a 20-year period throughout Southern California.

In 1916, H.T. Lucas, a contractor, sold one of these bungalows, located at 1728 West 51st Street, to Alfred Gary, an African-American. Within three weeks of the sale, the L.A. Investment Co., as the original developer, sued to compel Gary to forfeit his title based on a restrictive covenant barring the sale, lease, or occupancy “by one not of the Caucasian race.”

Like Homer Garrott, Gary won at the trial court level, but the L.A. Investment Co.’s appeal made it all the way to the California Supreme Court. The Supreme Court affirmed the “scholarly” opinion in the Garrott decision that restrictive covenants were “repugnant” to the interest created in the deed. As a result, Alfred Gary was legally entitled to buy his house on West 51st Street.

That, however, was not the end of the story. The Supreme Court had no objection to another provision in the L.A. Investment Co.’s deed against occupancy of the property by nonwhites. The net effect: the Garys were allowed to buy the house on West 51st Street, but they were not allowed to live in it. In dissenting to an order denying an en banc hearing, Chief Justice Frank M. Angellotti was incredulous: how can the holder of the estate be so restricted in his control of the property? ⁴

Loren Miller (pictured), an African-American journalist and attorney, who was admitted to the California State Bar in 1933, embarked upon a lifelong campaign to overturn the Gary decision and end racial bias in housing. He ultimately persuaded two Los Angeles Superior Court judges, Thurmond Clark and Stanley Mosk, to go beyond the Gary holding and strike down racial covenants on broad constitutional grounds.

On December 7, 1945, Judge Clark barred the white plaintiffs in the so-called “Sugar Hill” case from introducing any testimony that the defendants, including Oscar-winning actress Hattie McDaniel as well as legendary singer Ethel Waters, lowered property values in their West Adams neighborhood by ignoring the racially restrictive covenants against occupancy. Clark ruled, “It is time that members of the Negro race are accorded . . . the full rights guaranteed them under the 14th Amendment to the federal constitution.”

In like fashion, then-Superior Court Judge Stanley Mosk rebuffed a lawsuit by Pastor W. Clarence Wright of the Wilshire Presbyterian Church for a temporary injunction to evict his neighbors Frank and Artoria Drye from occupying their dream home in Country Club Park. Mosk dismissed the lawsuit as inconsistent with the 14th Amendment. “[T]here is no more reprehensible un-American activity than to attempt to deprive persons of their own homes on a ‘Master Race’ theory,” he wrote.

Miller cemented this victory on a national level when the U.S. Supreme Court, in a landmark decision, held racial covenants to be unenforceable. ⁵ Miller authored the briefs and argued the case along with cocounsel Thurgood Marshall.

In 1964, California Governor Edmund G. “Pat” Brown extended judicial appointments to both Loren Miller and Stanley Mosk, Miller to the Municipal Court bench and Mosk to the Supreme Court.

Artoria Drye lived in her Country Club Park house for 57 years, until her death in 2004 at age 106.

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⁵ Shelley v. Kraemer (1948) 334 U.S. 111. See also Estate of Dabney (1951) 37 Cal.2d 402; Dabney v. Philleo (1951) 38 Cal.2d 60.
During a second meeting with McKeon, Craig suggested that he donate $50,000 to Sen. Shortridge. (Shortridge ultimately was narrowly defeated in the 1932 Republican primary elections.)

In December 1934, a federal grand jury indicted Craig and others on charges of conspiring to obstruct justice. In May 1935, Craig was tried and convicted, sentenced to a year in jail and fined $1,000.

Despite this, Craig continued to sit on the Court of Appeal and even to author appellate opinions.°

Craig lost his federal appeal in February 1936° and the U.S. Supreme Court denied certiorari.

In the fall of 1936, the California attorney general began a quo warranto proceeding to oust Craig from his position as an appellate justice. On October 30, 1936, the California Supreme Court ruled that Craig was still entitled to his position and his $10,000 annual salary unless and until he resigned, was recalled or impeached.8

Although Craig was jailed in November 1936, he nonetheless refused to resign his appellate judgeship. As the San Jose News noted, as an active justice, Craig could issue writs of habeas corpus “to free every man in the county jail.”

In March 1937, Craig mailed a resignation letter to Gov. Frank Merriam when the California Legislature initiated removal proceedings by joint session. Craig said that any such legislative hearings would be a “farce.”

In May 1937, the Legislature proposed a constitutional amendment (the so-called “Craig Law”) requiring removal of any judge on conviction of felony or misdemeanor involving moral turpitude.

In September 1937, Craig was released from the Ventura County Jail. On September 2, 1938, the California Supreme Court permanently disbarred Craig, finding he was convicted of a felony involving moral turpitude, and even though he was a judge at the time, not a lawyer.9

In September 1942, President Franklin Roosevelt issued a presidential pardon to Craig and he was reinstated to the State Bar a month before his death in 1948.

7. Craig v. U.S. (9th Cir. 1936) 81 F.2d 816; see also 83 F.2d 450, dis. opn. of Denman, J.
8. People v. Craig (1936) 61 P.2d 934. The Court, acting on its own motion, subsequently vacated this controversial opinion. See People v. Craig (1937) 9 Cal.2d 615.
Embezzling funds to gamble and speculate in the stock market. Chandler assisted in Bartlett’s prosecution, and Bartlett was sentenced to prison.

Chandler himself took over Bartlett’s position and went on to become director of eight of the Dabney syndicates and president of three. He more modestly called himself “simply an overpriced employee.”

Among Dabney’s business associates was Clifford Dabney, his nephew. Beginning in 1924, Clifford became entangled with a bizarre religious cult, headed by May Otis Blackburn, its “high priestess.” Blackburn claimed that the archangels Gabriel and Michael were in the process of dictating a book to her, *The Great Sixth Seal*, which would reveal the location of all mineral and oil deposits in the world based on lost measurements from Noah and King Solomon (an unlikely duo). She convinced Clifford to finance the book’s completion. Over the next four-and-a-half years, Clifford gave her and the cult more than $40,000 in cash, land and oil royalties.

By 1929, Clifford still hadn’t received any information regarding the archangels’ hidden secrets of the earth. His uncle finally convinced him to go to the district attorney to demand an accounting and to complain of the fraud. Blackburn was prosecuted on 12 counts of grand theft.

Clifford also filed numerous civil suits against Blackburn. In December 1929, his attorneys spent three days deposing her in their offices in Suite 530 of the Bank of Italy Building.

Blackburn’s criminal trial on grand theft began in mid-January 1930 and lasted for seven weeks. The sensational testimony included evidence of strange rituals, sex scandals and the attempted resurrection of the lifeless body of a 16-year-old girl, who had died from an infected tooth in 1925, but whose body was preserved and guarded, along with seven dead puppies.
The secrets of the universe were not produced at Blackburn’s criminal trial. Defense witnesses testified that the only copy of the *Great Sixth Seal* mysteriously disappeared when the document, which reportedly took 42 months to write in longhand, was shipped out of state for safekeeping.

On March 2, 1930, Blackburn was convicted and sentenced to prison in San Quentin. Blackburn’s appeal went to the California Supreme Court. The Supreme Court reversed based on the prejudicial admission of evidence regarding “the gruesome story of the preservation of the body of Willa Rhoades, in the promise of resurrection,” which was irrelevant to the fraud charges against her. The court added a cautionary note about imposing criminal liability for “claims to the possession of exceptional spiritual power or knowledge.”

On remand, L.A. Superior Court Judge Thomas Patrick White dismissed all charges against Blackburn for insufficient evidence.

In June 1931, Joseph Dabney fired Raymond Chandler, then 44-years old, based on a coworker’s report of habitual absenteeism, drunkenness and womanizing. Chandler considered filing suit for slander, but, as many of his biographers came to recognize, the charges had a considerable measure of veracity.

Chandler did get some measure of retribution. Using inside information he had acquired during his lengthy employ, Chandler assisted a longtime personal friend, oilman Edward Lloyd, in pursuing a lawsuit against Dabney for misappropriation of revenues from an oil lease in Ventura County.

In gratitude, the Lloyd family gave Chandler a monthly stipend of $100, which Chandler put to good use while he sought to dry himself out and pursue a new career as a published writer of pulp fiction and detective novels. His first story was released in 1933. He later wrote in his notebook as a potential title for a future detective novel, “The law is where you buy it.”

Joseph Dabney died in September 1932, but his death did not put an end to the lawsuits. In the late 1940s, Clifford Dabney sued his uncle’s $6 million estate for conspiracy to defraud him of oil royalties. The litigation reached the California Supreme Court before being resolved by settlement.

In January 2018, the long-vacant Bank of Italy Building reopened as the swank NoMad Hotel.

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11. *Estate of Dabney* (1951) 37 Cal.2d 402; *Dabney v. Philleo* (1951) 38 Cal.2d 60.
My friend Ephraim Margolin had a difficult task as he faced the California Supreme Court. He wanted to stop an initiative called the Victim’s Bill of Rights, Proposition 8, before the voters could express their will. A nationally recognized civil rights lawyer, Ephraim was talking directly into the winds of jurisprudential change. It was the spring of 1982. On the bench were Chief Justice Rose Bird and Justices Stanley Mosk, Frank Richardson, Otto Kaus, Allan Broussard, Cruz Reynoso, and Frank Newman. Outside the court, the American people had decided that the time had come for law and order. At the national level, the U.S. Supreme Court featured strict construction of defendants’ rights, their decisions dovetailing President Ronald Reagan’s thoughts on law enforcement.

By the time of the Prop. 8 cases, the love, freedom, and anti-establishment thinking of the 1960s had disappeared into society’s rear-view mirror. Those who had screamed from the barricades, “Never trust anyone over 30,” were now 35. Handsome, well-educated but ineffective, Mayor John Lindsey of New York City symbolized a needed transition from wildly libertarian self-discovery to the return of conformist structure. There were riots in the New York City jail known as “The Tombs.” Violent gangs seemed much too numerous, uncontrolled, and frightening. Earlier, as California’s governor, Ronald Reagan had promised a tougher law and order approach for police and the courts and judges who would carry out that new, conservative attitude. In May 1969, UC Berkeley students took over People’s Park near Telegraph Avenue. When authorities tried to take the park back, a rally of 3,000 turned into a riot. That day became known as Bloody Sunday. Reagan declared a state of emergency and sent 2,200 troops to Berkeley. One thousand citizens were arrested, many taken to the Santa Rita Jail and beaten. One man was shot and died four days later. Tear gas floated over the campus as scholars tried to teach amid the bedlam. The violence was a national news story with TV images of students clashing with soldiers. One student who joined the rally was called up to the National Guard. Madness reigned and my town of Berkeley has never been what you could call orderly.

Reagan’s firmness eventually made him president. As Ephraim was arguing against allowing voters to decide on Prop. 8, Ronald Reagan had become our 40th president. He delivered what America wanted: strong law enforcement and the reduction of criminal defense procedural “tricks,” never mind that some of those “tricks” were in the U.S. Constitution. He had brought to the White House his tested California conservative political themes. Four years before his Iran-Contra scandal broke, Reagan was very popular. Personally, he seemed candid and likable. My partner Bob Raven saw the president’s charm up close when Bob went to the White House to meet with him as chair of the ABA’s committee on judicial selection. As Bob was leaving, the president stood by the door.

“Bob, are you going back to California?” he asked.

Bob said, “I am, Mr. President.”

“I wish I was,” said the leader of the free world.

Reagan was masterful at conveying a national message that turned the stomachs of every California criminal defense lawyer. As though to tell the nation what had changed, Fleetwood Mac issued an album named Law and Order.

The Problems with Proposition 8

Feeling a conservative wind at their back, the drafters of Prop. 8 put into one document many, quite different, conservative criminal favorites. The central legal question was whether the initiative violated article II, section 8 of the California Constitution which commands that, “[a]n initiative measure embracing more than one subject may not be submitted to the electors or have any effect.” Seems simple enough. Prop. 8 covered diverse subjects.

One section of the initiative contained seven separate subdivisions. It repealed article I, section 12, relating to bail. It also added five new sections to the Penal Code and three separate sections to the Welfare and Institutions Code.

The constitutional provision in the proposed initiative, section 3, added section 28 to article I, declaring that victims of crime have a right to restitution from wrongdoers for financial losses and the right to expect that wrongdoers will be punished.1

Among the sections were provisions specifying that:

* Jim Brosnahan, senior trial counsel at Morrison & Foerster, is the author of the forthcoming Trial Lawyer.
Students and staff of schools from elementary to high school have the right to be safe on school campuses. Relevant evidence in criminal proceedings shall not be excluded (with certain exceptions) unless the Legislature provides otherwise in a statute enacted by a two-thirds vote. This section was clearly unconstitutional. Limited procedures for release of suspects on bail or own recognizance. Permitted the greater use of prior felony convictions for impeachment or for enhancement of a sentence. Abolished the defense of diminished capacity. Increased the punishment of persons convicted of specified felonies who have been previously convicted of such crimes. Allowed victims of crime to attend juvenile sentencing and parole proceedings and be heard, and required the judge or parole board to state whether the criminal would pose a threat to public safety if granted parole or probation. Forbade plea bargaining to specified crimes except under certain circumstances. Rendered provisions of the Welfare and Institutions Code relating to the commitment and treatment of mentally disordered sex offenders “inoperative.”

The First Decision
On March 11, 1982, a majority of the court voted to allow the initiative to proceed with a vote of the people. In six paragraphs the opinion declared what the court was doing was “customary.” The court did not reach the single-subject issue. Justices Newman, Mosk and Chief Justice Bird dissented.

On June 8, 1982, the voters passed Prop. 8 by 56 percent of the vote.

A Numerical Puzzle for Voters
The people had spoken. But what had they said? What was the law now? Prop. 8 had so many sections that any voter could be confused, befuddled, or angry. A voter could favor parts 1, 4, 6, and 9, and not favor 3, 7, and 8. Victims of crime deserve protection, but not the repeal of constitutional rights. When the courts or the Legislature attempt to discern the meaning of Prop. 8, how would they do that, given its complexity? But voters are allowed to express their will. Voters had legitimate concern for personal safety. Legislators are also limited to passing legislation embracing only one subject. What does it mean that a California initiative is limited to a single subject?

The Second Round
After the election Ephraim asked me to argue the second case with him. We did our homework. We pulled down the dictionary.

“Single = one and no more; only one.”

“The goddess of justice is wearing a black arm-band today, as she weeps for the Constitution of California.”

The Second Argument
The courtroom was packed. The importance of the case was palpable. The seven justices filed in solemnly, sat down, and looked out at us. We made four arguments. First, Prop. 8 was void because it repealed by implication various statutes not identified, in violation of article IV, section 9 of the state Constitution. Second, the bail amendment was void because it did not set out the text of what was repealed. Third, changes are not valid to the extent they will severely curtail basic governmental functions, including court procedures. And fourth, this proposition was so vast that it was an impermissible revision, not an allowable amendment. The matter was submitted. The justices filed out. Our team retreated to the basement for coffee and discussion. We felt good. We saw four favorable votes, Chief Justice Bird, and Justices Mosk, Broussard, and Newman who had spent his whole teaching life supporting civil rights.

The Second Decision
On September 2, 1982, in a decision by Richardson, the court upheld Prop. 8. Newman joined the majority. Chief Justice Bird, and Justices Mosk and Broussard dissented. Bird’s dissent ran 17 pages. Mosk, the former attorney general of California, ended his dissent this way:

“Subject = something thought about, discussed, studied.”

We were up a dark alley of questions and confronting a brick wall of uncertainty. No help from the dictionary.

The California history of the single-subject rule required that the provisions must be reasonably germane to each other. Voters are allowed to deal comprehensively with a subject. The single-subject rule required that an initiative be construed liberally. One initiative had been upheld although it enacted a wide spectrum of provisions amending the probate law. Our Morrison & Foerster team was composed of Linda Shostak, Andy Monach, and me. Linda took the lead on the brief. We stressed the difficulty any voter would have in deciding on how to vote. The rule was there to protect the voter from complex initiatives with smuggled provisions. We argued that Prop. 8 was not an allowable amendment. It was an impermissible revision. We counted heads. The court had split three-to-three the first time. The deciding fourth vote was Broussard’s concurring opinion providing that there was not enough time to consider the complexities and adding that after passage an initiative could be held to not have any effect. He said his concurrence did not preclude later review.

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Looking Back
As a former federal prosecutor, I agree that the victim’s right to be heard was overdue.

Continued on page 26
EDITOR’S NOTE: Harry Pregerson served as a United States Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and assumed senior status on December 11, 2015. Before that, he served on the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California. In 1988, Judge Pregerson helped found the Salvation Army Bell Shelter, a shelter for homeless people in southeast Los Angeles County. He died on November 25, 2017 at the age of 94.

When I was eight years old, my grandfather gave me a stone with the inscription “Never, never, ever, quit.” Being eight, I didn’t have anything to quit from.

When I was ten, my grandfather bought me the book, How to Win Friends and Influence People, by Dale Carnegie. Win friends? Influence people? I was focused on trying to be like Michael Jordan.

As I got older, my grandfather continued to buy me books: biographies of Abraham Lincoln; speeches of Winston Churchill; and William Strunk’s Elements of Style, a book that he would constantly remind me was the classic manual on the principles of English language. One summer, we went through Strunk cover to cover. He would call me on Sunday mornings and say, without any introduction, “Turn to page 57.” During one weekend session, that I will never forget because it was a particularly beautiful summer day, I asked him if we could skip that day’s session. “Grandpa, it’s a beautiful day; I want to go outside and have fun like the other kids,” I said. He responded, “Brad, let me tell you something, fun is bullshit.” Fun is bullshit. What? That was ironic coming from a person who loved to make people laugh.

But even at 12-years old, I knew what he really meant: don’t waste time; every day work toward bettering yourself; always strive to be better.

You might be thinking he tortured me. Yes, maybe a little. But to tell the truth, I loved those Sunday morning sessions and I cherish every book he gave me, including the boring ones. Grandpa Harry was a scholar and believed that in order to make sense of the world, a person must have a deep understanding of history. I am grateful that he taught this important lesson to me.

It was wonderful he cared so much, but it might sound like he put a lot of pressure on me. This wasn’t the case. He was the best listener and always so understanding. All he cared about was effort. “Just try your best,” he would say, “everything will turn out ok.” School never came easy for me, and he told me it was hard for him too. He used to remind me that it wasn’t until he got into law school that he learned that the word “obtuse” meant slow to understand rather than near-sightedness. “Grandma was the brains,” he would always say, “you and I just have to march through the mud.”

Often people who are so dedicated to their work and the community leave their families feeling left behind—not Grandpa Harry. I know all the grandchildren agree that he made us feel loved and that we were the most important people in his life.

I loved watching him interact with strangers. In his later years, I went with him to many dinners and charity events. He would be seated at a table and a stranger inevitably would approach and introduce himself. Grandpa would slowly extend his hand. They would

* Bradley Pregerson is Judge Pregerson’s grandson and a deputy city attorney with the City of Los Angeles. He is also the co-founder of the non-profit GrowGood, which operates an urban farm at the Salvation Army Bell Shelter that provides food, job training and employment opportunities to the homeless.
shake, and suddenly, the stranger was confronted with a Kung fu grip that he or she could not escape. The crippling grip continued as pleasantries were exchanged while the stranger pretended everything was normal. The handshake would continue such an unusually long period of time that the stranger would finally begin to smile or laugh, I’m sure thinking, this crazy old judge is squeezing the crap out of my hand and won’t let go. Eventually, Grandpa would release his grip and a conversation, or rather a history lesson, would ensue: “Oh, you live downtown near Pershing Square? Did you know that Pershing was a WWI general?” Soon, contact information was requested, and then exchanged, and just like that, the stranger had unknowingly “enlisted” as a member of Grandpa’s army.

And I knew from experience that this stranger would soon receive a late-night phone call. Perhaps on Sunday night, and right when a favorite show came on or dinner was ready, the phone would ring. “Who could be calling at such an hour?” the stranger would ask. The thought of letting it go to voicemail was quickly discarded because we all know, you can’t ignore a call from a federal judge. (This applies with equal force to judges’ grandchildren.) So, the stranger would answer the phone and Grandpa would say: “I need your help on something,” or “I just spoke to so-and-so and you need to call him.” “But it’s late,” the stranger would reply. “No, he is expecting your call,” Grandpa would reply. The stranger now had marching orders and was suddenly and permanently swept up into the good fight.

I like what John Quincy Adams said about leadership: “If your actions inspire others to do more, to learn more, to dream more or become more, you are a leader.” I think this sums up what my grandfather was about. And the truth is that all the good deeds he was able to accomplish were not the result of his efforts alone; no, there was an army of people who stood and fought with him, who began as strangers, who were brought in with a Kung fu grip, and soon became life-long friends. But Grandpa certainly wasn’t afraid to take bold action, inspiring others to join him and they did, because all knew he was fighting the good fight, he was a good man, and he would never, never ever quit.

**Brosnahan v. Eu**
*Continued from page 24*

But the curtailment of constitutional rights and mental defenses was a mistake because it obstructed truth finding. In every criminal case the question is: what happened here?

Restitution is often an absurd and illusory remedy unless the defendant still has money.

The harsh increasing of sentences that swept the state for so long eventually created such expense that cries for reform were heard in our Legislature.

What happened when later courts reviewed all these provisions is a proper subject for another article.

**One Last Thing**

Why is my name on this case? One Saturday morning, 50 criminal defense lawyers gathered from all over the state for a meeting of the board of directors of the California Attorneys for Criminal Justice. They are heroic, feisty lawyers, contrarian, and outspoken people who devote their professional lives to keeping the justice system honest. It has always been hard for me to imagine our democracy without them. We, as a group, signed up to be plaintiffs to stop Prop. 8. “Oh, I did that,” my friend Ephraim answered when I asked him why I was listed as the lead plaintiff. On August 24, 2017, in Briggs v. Edmund G. Brown, the court cited Brosnahan v. Eu and upheld Prop. 66, which expedites judicial review of death penalty cases. Be careful what you sign. Your name may end up supporting things you strongly disagree with.

**Endnotes**

1. § 28, subd. (a).
2. Subds. (a), (c).
3. Subd. (d).
4. Subd. (e).
5. Subd. (f).
6. § 4 [adding § 25, subd. (a)].
7. § 5 [adding § 667, subd. (a)].
8. § 6 [adding §§ 1191.1, 3043].
9. § 7 [adding § 1192.7].
10. § 9 [adding § 6331].
13. 31 Cal.3d at pp. 4–5.
15. 32 Cal.3d at p. 299.
16. (2017) 3 Cal. 5th 808.
Kathleen A. Cairns
THE CASE OF ROSE BIRD:
GENDER, POLITICS, AND THE CALIFORNIA COURTS
328 pages; $36.95 (Hardcover).
Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2016

Kathleen Cairns’ insightful, well-written, and meticulously-researched book, The Case of Rose Bird, shows how and why California’s seemingly apolitical Supreme Court became politicized, exposing justices for the first time to the vagaries of electoral politics — and affecting, possibly, the entire California judiciary. Indeed, as this review is being written, several sitting California trial judges face challenges, even from the left, that have little or nothing to do with their competence, temperament, or other relevant criteria — a poignant reminder of how Bird’s “case” is very much still with us.

Cairns entitles her book The Case of Rose Bird rather than one that bears just Bird’s name — and entitles her chapter about the 1986 retention election “The People v. Rose Bird.” She may be suggesting that the battle over Bird is like a trial and that we should decide her “case” based on the “evidence” that each “side” proffers.

Whatever Cairns’ title signifies, she believes Bird’s “case” forever compromised judicial independence. Cairns correctly notes that the controversy over Bird was the “opening salvo” in an “ongoing, bitter, and expensive war over control of the nation’s judicial system.” Although the $10 million spent on California’s 1986 Supreme Court retention election was record-setting then, since the 1990s, more than $300 million has been spent on judicial campaigns nationally. Spending like this no doubt tests judges’ resolve to adhere to the rule of law and to facilitate challenges to excesses of power and injustice.

Rose Bird was a trailblazing and controversial figure from any perspective. Yet ironically, as Cairns points out, today, relatively few remember her, much less why her “case” is so important. Indeed, although Bird’s photo looms large in a hallway at her alma mater, Berkeley Law, students generally are unaware how the battles over her controversial 1977 nomination and the grueling 1978 and 1986 retention elections affected judicial selection and, arguably, judicial decision making. By examining “where it all started,” Cairns argues, we can gain insight into how “canny campaign operatives honed their skills by shaping public perception” and used ordinary persons’ fears and concerns to “hijack the California Supreme Court.”

The book’s thesis, which Cairns documents in detail, is that Bird’s gender “significantly enhanced her vulnerability,” all but dooming her quest to remain in the top spot at one of the nation’s most influential courts. As a symbol of change, Bird threatened to dominate the courts at a time when the women’s rights movement was strong. For Cairns, timing was everything: “second-wave feminism” reached its peak in the early 1980s (the first “wave” was in the late 19th and early 20th centuries), making Bird — unmarried, childless, young, and (to many) stubborn, controlling, uncompromising, and principled to a fault — an easy target for those wanting to push back. And that “target” was easier to “hit” when other Jerry Brown justices — Cruz Reynoso, Joe Grodin, and Frank Newman in particular — joined her in controversial rulings.

Cairns chronicles Bird’s meteoric rise — hardworking and gifted student, Ford Foundation fellow, Nevada Supreme Court law clerk, deputy public defender, Stanford Law instructor, Jerry Brown campaign aide and confidante, Agricultural and Services Agency secretary, and finally, chief justice. Even beyond her many “firsts” (first woman justice, let alone chief, first woman and non-farmer agriculture secretary, etc.), her achievements were impressive. They included banning the short-handled hoe for farmworkers, authoring the Agricultural Labor Relations Act, streamlining and improving Supreme Court operations, continuing the push for state trial court funding, promoting an independent office devoted to representing capital defendants, and, of course, participating in or authoring major decisions.

In spite of these achievements, Cairns argues, the “confluence of gender and politics doomed Rose Bird,
and neither she nor her allies possessed the tools to mount an effective counterattack.” As Bird said, “I was a woman being placed at the head of an aristocratic body, a kind of priesthood.” Cairns documents well why that “priesthood” was not ready for (much less welcoming of) a high priestess of Bird’s ilk.

Cairns also shows how difficult and uncompromising Bird could be — describing her (or quoting others’ descriptions of her) as “judgmental,” “abrupt,” “brutally honest,” “hard on herself and others,” “self-righteous,” “brutally honest,” “aloof,” “a loner,” “willing to speak truth to power,” rejecting “government by public relations,” “unecessarily antagonistic,” unable to tell “white lies” or “stroke egos,” and lacking “subtlety.”

It was widely publicized that Bird never voted to affirm any of the 60 death sentences that came before her. Her absolutism in this regard may have been fueled by her unwavering devotion to process. Consider People v. Frierson, which declared the 1977 death penalty initiative constitutional. Cairns labels Bird’s Frierson dissent “excessively confrontational.” In it, Bird faulted the majority for having “rush[ed] to judgment” in deciding key issues in dicta, and wrote that “[n]o matter how clamorous the movement of the moment,” the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment “may not be submitted to vote [and depends on] the outcome of no election.” Aware of the public’s focus on the death penalty, Cairns notes, Bird knew she was “walking into a minefield” where “[e]very future death penalty opinion of hers would go under a microscope.”

Bird’s December 1978 letter to the Commission on Judicial Performance — sent by her alone without consulting her colleagues and opposed even by her ally Justice Newman — triggered the Commission’s hearings to investigate the Court’s alleged delay in issuing the pro-defense People v. Tanner decision until after the 1978 retention election. Cairns suggests that Justice William Clark’s pre–election day discussions with outsiders prompted a Los Angeles Times article accusing the Court of the delay. But Cairns omits mentioning the widely reported question the Times reporter asked Clark (“If in the morning you were to read the story I described to you [about Tanner’s filing being delayed], would you throw your coffee cup against the wall?”) and Clark’s nonresponse (“I might have responded with a chuckle”); the colloquy suggested he was the source, although that was never proved.

The hearings were the first time the public was exposed to the Court’s inner workings — including, Cairns says, the justices’ “petty, hypersensitive, and backstabbing” ways. With the hearings, Cairns asserts, the justices descended from “Olympian heights to mingle with mere mortals,” which, she says, fueled the emergence of a “political judiciary.”

By 1979, when the Tanner hearings ended, and with a death penalty law upheld yet no executions carried out, Attorney General (and later Governor) George Deukmejian’s moment was at hand. He was able to join (or mount) the campaign to defeat Bird and others in 1986, which would enable him to appoint several Supreme Court justices in one fell swoop. It was at that “moment,” Cairns says, that Bird began facing her “real ordeal” — years of scrutiny of her every move and rulings. Those years gave Bird’s opponents the chance to “shape[e] her image as an ‘extremist,’ ‘judicial activist,’ and an all-around unsympathetic individual,” culminating in the unprecedented and nasty campaign that removed her.

To her credit, Cairns balances the negatives about Bird with accounts of her more positive side — her many caring and thoughtful actions, her loyalty to friends, and her quick wit and good sense of humor. Cairns’ point, however, is that that side was all but lost in her opponents’ zeal to shape her as an “activist,” out-of-touch justice who deserved to lose. And, ironically, Cairns says, Deukmejian, who had “spent nearly a decade stalking [Bird],” would forever be linked to her. One fellow Republican, Cairns reports, said that Bird is the foundation of his legacy: Deukmejian lacked other remarkable career achievements, but his relentless attacks forever changed the judiciary and the Court.
Cairns’ book is accessible not only to those trained in the law, but to anyone interested in how Bird’s “case” shaped history. Cairns achieves this accessibility by giving the reader context — the pioneering role the Court had in shaping criminal defendants’ and consumers’ rights in the decades before Bird arrived, the absence of viable opposition to justices’ appointments or retention before her, the impenetrable “old boys’ club” she repeatedly confronted (including Justice Stanley Mosk’s open and continuing hostility as the heir apparent who was not named chief), and the death penalty jurisprudence at the time the voters adopted the confounding 1977 and 1978 capital punishment laws.

Cairns posits that even before Bird arrived, the Court was pushing the law into new territory, which her gender and lack of experience enabled opponents to slow or even reverse. Her continued willingness to challenge the “business and prosecutorial establishments” enhanced her vulnerability, permitting “corporate leaders” to partner with law and order groups to gain control of the Court. Concerned about the Bird Court’s pro-plaintiff rulings, Cairns notes, big business jumped on the “tough on crime” bandwagon already in motion, with campaign consultants “provid[ing] the emotional rhetoric [while] corporate interests provided the cash.”

Bird’s negative character traits that Cairns describes may also explain her stubborn (even “foolhardy”) decision to manage what one friend called her “isolated” and “ineffectual” 1986 campaign — which included writing her own television spots while also running California’s judiciary. This, like her judicial decisions, encouraged and aided her opponents’ campaign to politicize a judiciary led by an “uncompromising” chief.

Cairns poignantly describes the personal cost and political scars that Bird’s defeat carried. She experienced a post-election slide into near oblivion in which she became, as one former judge described her, a “virtual pariah.” Bird faced a compromised ability to earn a living worthy of a former chief (she said she “learned to scale down and live like a student again”). And she confronted an increasingly difficult struggle with another recurrence of breast cancer, from which she died at a young 63.

In her final chapters, Cairns attempts to answer whether the 1986 election was an “anomaly” that required “a female target possessing thin skin, a hypersensitive, prickly personality and an unyielding sense of how she believed the law should work,” or, rather, was “the vanguard of a larger movement aimed at challenging the judiciary itself.” A Los Angeles Times remembrance answered that question, opining that Bird’s defeat “woke a slumbering giant” and that her legacy embodies a “warning” that “henceforth, beneath the robe of a jurist, there better beat the heart of a politician.”

Agreeing with that opinion, Cairns cites several post-Bird examples: Robert Bork’s failed Supreme Court nomination subjected him to the “relentless glare of media exposure” — to which Bird’s confirmation had seemingly “opened the door.” Karl Rove led conservative moves against a plaintiff-friendly Texas Supreme Court. A Mississippi justice lost after barring the death penalty for a rapist who had not killed his victim. A Nebraska justice was defeated after the opposition criticized his decisions overturning a term-limits law and requiring malice in second degree murder cases. A Tennessee justice lost for overturning a defendant’s death sentence (but affirming his conviction) and for being an “uppity woman” who lacked “family values” and never took her husband’s name. And three Iowa justices lost their 2010 retention bids after striking down Iowa’s gay marriage ban.

In California, Chief Justice Ronald M. George and Justice Ming Chin retained their seats in 1998 after they were targeted for invalidating a law requiring parental consent for minors’ abortions. Even so, Cairns notes, their campaigns were distracting and expensive ($1 million each). Here and elsewhere, although judges have fended off similar efforts, well-funded and organized campaigns requiring judges to respond are now the norm. Cairns mentions Justice Otto Kaus’s famous remark — ignoring the political consequences of visible decisions is like ignoring a “crocodile in your bathtub” — underscoring the fact that a single unpopular ruling can upend a lengthy, successful, or otherwise unblemished judicial career. Santa Clara Superior Court Judge Aaron Persky’s “case” is Exhibit A.

Cairns ends her book with an overview of the current California Supreme Court justices, all of whom have avoided the kind of criticism leveled at Bird and her opponents. In his second stint as governor, Jerry Brown’s Supreme Court appointments — a diverse, young, and inexperienced group of justices — all received unanimous confirmation votes, and the electorate now pays far less attention to retention elections. Cairns notes that in contrast to Bird, Chief Justice Tani Cantil-Sakauye receives accolades for her feminine demeanor — she is described as “disarming, charming, accessible, and self-deprecating.” And although Cantil-Sakauye has publicly stated California’s death penalty is “not working,” no one has demanded her removal or even criticized her for her stance.

One is therefore left to wonder whether Bird’s “case” really was, as Cairns says, a unique “confluence of forces” conspiring to doom her, or whether that “conspiracy” could rear its head again if circumstances presented themselves. While we wait and see, we have Cairns to thank for a well-structured peek into a dark period in California’s judicial history.
TRIBUTES TO
JUSTICE KATHRYN MICKLE
WERDEGAR

TRIBUTES FROM THE CALIFORNIA
SUPREME COURT

Goodwin Liu
Ming Chin
Carol Corrigan
Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar
Leondra Kruger
Tani Cantil-Sakauye
Ronald M. George
Joseph R. Grodin

KAY WERDEGAR'S ENDURING LEGACY
Arthur Gilbert

AND HERE'S TO YOU, JUSTICE WERDEGAR
Richard Frank

CELEBRATING JUDGE KAY
Jake Dear

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*Please note that issues prior to 2006 were published as California Supreme Court Historical Society Yearbook. (4 vols., 1994 to 1998–1999.)
This volume, published in January 2018, is Part II of a two-part tribute to Justice Kathryn Mickle Werdegar on the occasion of her retirement from the California Supreme Court on August 31, 2017. It is a theme volume with articles on topics in Environmental Law, one of Justice Werdegar’s areas of special interest. Part I, published in December 2017, is a companion volume that presents personal tributes to Justice Werdegar, her oral history, bibliography, and two of her unpublished speeches.

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**Attention Law Students — And Friends of Law Students:**

June 30 is the deadline for entries in the Society’s 2018 Selma Moidel Smith Law Student Writing Competition in California legal history. All law students are eligible. The first-place entry will be published in the Society’s annual journal, California Legal History, and the author will receive a prize of $2500. Prizes may also be awarded for second- and third-place entries. Complete information is available in the call for entries at https://www.cschs.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/2018-Writing-Competition-Announcement.pdf.
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On the cover: Supporters and opponents of marriage equality gathered outside San Francisco City Hall and the California Supreme Court, March 4, 2008.

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